Read Aloud the Text Content

This audio was created by Woord's Text to Speech service by content creators from all around the world.

Text Content or SSML code:

The reasons for protesting a serious injustice are usually not hard to find. One wants to put an end to the wrongdoing, to prevent its recurrence, or at least touch some consciences in a way that may prove beneficial in other contexts. But sometimes there seems to be no reasonable hope of achieving these ends. The perpetrators of injustice will not be moved, protest may be inconvenient or risky to oneself, and its long-range effects on others may be minimal or may include as much harm as help. To protest in these circumstances seems at best a symbolic gesture. But is it a gesture worth making? Attitudes about this diverge sharply. Some say that, despite the consequences, protest is called for: "One cannot stand silently by." To denounce injustice at a risk to oneself is morally admirable, they say, whether or not it pro- duces a positive net utility. Others see symbolic protest as pointless and at times reprehensible. If the overall effects for others are not better and it entails harm or risk to oneself, is it not foolish? And isn't the motive simply a self-righteous desire to be, or appear, morally "pure"? These conflicting attitudes pose a problem of understanding for moral philosophy. The point of view behind the second attitude is clear enough: acts, including speech acts, are to be evaluated by their prob- able consequences; no one is morally required to take risks unless the probable consequences are beneficial; what is commendable is regard for the best results, not futile gestures. If silence, even compromise, is well calculated to produce the best consequences, then that is the course one should take. This consequentialist attitude is familiar and, n the absence of cogent alternatives, very appealing. In reflecting on sample cases, however, many of us, I think, will find ourselves drawn to the first attitude, which regards symbolic protest as commendable despite the risks. But what can be said for it? Why should we feel that symbolic protest is often appropriate and admirable rather than foolish and self-righteous? First passage listen carefully iida. It may be well to begin by fixing attention on some examples. Consider first an old woman in Nazi Germany. She lives on modest savings and offers no support to the Nazi regime either physically or morally. When the latest discriminatory laws against Jews are enforced, she is moved to protest. As a non-Jew she could have remained silent and thereby avoided much subsequent harassment. She is regarded as a silly eccentric and so cannot expect to make an impact on others, much less to stop the Nazi machinery. She still feels that she should speak up, but she wonders why. Next consider a liberal businessmen at a racist dinner party. Invited by business acquaintances, he is shocked to find that the conversation on all sides is openly and grossly contemptuous of certain minorities on grounds of racial bias alone. The guests try to outdo one another with tales about how they manage to circumvent equal opportunity laws. Polite opposition yields nothing but cynical laughter. The indignant liberal is convinced at last that nothing he can say will have any good effect on this company. He wonders then whether it is best to finish the dinner quietly, for the sake of his business interests, or to walk out in protest.' These cases exemplify certain conditions which I shall take as paradigmatic of the problem of symbolic protest, at least of the sort I intend to discuss: (a) the protest is of a serious injustice done to others; (b) The protest cannot reasonably be expected to end the injustice, to prevent its recurrence, or to rectify it in any way; (c) the protest may cause some harm, but not disaster, to the protestor; (d) the effects of the protest on others' welfare can reasonably be expected to be minimal or to include a balance of benefit and harm. In real cases, of course, the facts may be disputed, but for present purposes let us take these conditions as given. It should be noted too that in each case the agent wonders what is the best thing to do. The issue is not whether to do what one has antecedently decided is best. Thus rhetorical appeals such as, "Do what your conscience tells you" and "Do the courageous thing," are beside the point. Conscience has not yet spoken unequivocally; and, while it is courageous to take risks for what one believes best, the decision about what is best has not been finally made. The examples have been deliberately constructed to set aside famil- iar utilitarian arguments for protest. In most real situations, of course, these cannot be lightly dismissed. From a utilitarian point of view a very small chance to stop a great harm will warrant considerable risk and sacrifice. So even if protest seems very likely to be futile, the outside chance that it could work will often justify the problems it may cause. Also the indirect benefits of protest should not be underestimated in actual cases. Even the hardest heart may soften, if not melt, under moral pressure, and protest may comfort the victims and encourage others to resist injustice elsewhere. In setting aside utilitarian considerations, however, we do not necessarily limit our conclusions to cases in which they do not apply. For if, by focusing on the restricted cases, we can find non-utilitarian arguments for protest, these may reinforce whatever utilitarian arguments there are for protest. Second passage, still liste dear? II Having set aside utilitarian considerations, it is natural to look for reasons for protest among the principles comrmonly held by deontologists. These would include prohibitions of promise-breaking, deliberate deception, killing of innocents, and the like. In special cases of symbolic protest these principles might be applicable. Suppose, for example, that I have made a solemn promise to a friend that I will not stand by while his good name is slandered by his enemies after his death. Then, as soon as he dies, greedy and malicious biographers try to make a quick profit by inventing scandalous stories about him. Suppose that I know that the stories are false, but I cannot prove it. Even if I cannot prevent their publication or force retractions, it seems I should protest and tell the truth as I know it. This seems so, even if the effort is inconvenient to me and the effect on others is insignifi- cant. There may also be times when protest is necessary to avoid deception. Suppose, for example, that a group of people is doing what I regard quite wrong, say, amusing themselves by slaughtering polar bears with rifles from helicopters. But imagine that these are wealthy, influential people, with whom for selfish reasons I want to be associated. If I let my true feelings show, they may break off the association; and I am reasonably convinced that I cannot change them. Avoiding the issue, let us say, is impossible: I must pretend to condone their activites or else let them know my objections. As they, assuming our mutual respect, come to count me as a friend, surely I should not persist in the deception. These cases seem straightforward but atypical. Normally one does not need to make a protest to avoid breaking promises or building friendships on deception. In other special situations deontological principles come into play in a rather more complex way. Consider the judge in Nazi Germany who is ordered to sign death warrants for political prisoners whom he believes innocent. To refuse will only result in his replacement by someone else who will sign the warrants. A protest would achieve nothing but dismissal. He figures that he can bring about some good results by keeping quiet, signing the warrants, and trying to help others secretly later. But this path of calculated silence is blocked if there is an absolute, or at least quite stringent, moral principle against killing innocent people. His only remaining choices are to resign without protest or to resign (or be dismissed) with protest. The principle against killing does not itself require protest but it rules out the only appealing alternative.