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KoreaVictimSupportUNODCv2 Slide 1 Title Slide Good morning, everyone. Thank you very much for that kind introduction, and thank you to UNODC and LPSK for the invitation to speak today. It is truly an honour to be here in Jakarta. My name is Presenter Name, and I serve as a prosecutor at the Supreme Prosecutors Office of the Republic of Korea. Over the past several years, my work has focused specifically on the protection of crime victims — ensuring that our criminal justice system does not treat victims merely as sources of evidence, but as human beings who have suffered real harm and who deserve real support. Korea has spent more than three decades building what we believe is one of the most comprehensive victim support systems in Asia. Today, I would like to share how we got here — the legal architecture, the institutional machinery, and most importantly, how it works in practice, including through the lens of three real cases. I will specifically focus on the link between asset recovery and victim compensation — an area that UNCAC Articles 34 and 35 address directly, and where we believe Koreas experience offers genuinely transferable lessons. Slide 2 Agenda Here is how we will spend our 30 minutes together. We will begin with a brief look at why victim rights emerged as a priority — the historical and philosophical shift that made this possible. We will then move through Koreas legal and institutional framework. From there, we explore the full suite of support services that victims can access, and then we zoom in on asset recovery and compensation — which is where Articles 34 and 35 of UNCAC come alive. I will then walk you through three real cases from our prosecution service. And we close with lessons learned and six concrete recommendations for jurisdictions that are building these systems. Slide 3 Background The Evolution of Victim Rights Let me start with a question that I think frames everything that follows how did victims become the forgotten parties in criminal justice In premodern systems, victims were at the center. They brought charges they sought redress. But with the rise of the modern state and the concept of crime as an offense against the public order — against the sovereign — the state took over prosecution. Victims became witnesses, nothing more. By the midtwentieth century, a victim was simply one piece of evidence in the states case against the accused. Koreas trajectory follows this global pattern, but with a notable turning point. In 1987, when Korea revised its Constitution, two specific provisions were introduced Article 27, guaranteeing victims the right to testify in trial proceedings, and Article 30, guaranteeing victims the right to seek state compensation for criminal damage. These are not merely aspirational principles — they are enforceable constitutional rights. Building on this constitutional foundation, Korea enacted the Crime Victims Protection Act in 1988 — later replaced by a far more comprehensive statute in 2005. Since then, we have continuously expanded and refined the system. The establishment of a dedicated Criminal Asset Recovery Division at the Supreme Prosecutors Office in 2018 — which I will discuss in detail — marked a critical milestone in connecting asset recovery directly to victim support. The underlying philosophy has three pillars state responsibility — because the states failure to prevent crime creates an obligation to support its victims social welfare — because recovering from crime is a public interest matter and restorative justice — because criminal proceedings should aim not just at punishment but at healing. Slide 4 Legal Framework Koreas victim support system rests on a solid legal foundation. Let me walk you through the key statutes on this slide. At the very top is the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, which has enshrined victim rights since 1987. Article 27 guarantees crime victims the right to testify during trial proceedings — meaning victims are not merely passive observers but active participants in the justice process. Article 30 goes further it establishes every citizens right to seek state compensation for bodily injury or death caused by criminal acts. These two constitutional provisions are what give Koreas victim support system its fundamental legitimacy. Moving to the three laws in the upper row The Criminal Procedure Act provides the procedural backbone. It gives victims the right to make a statement before the court upon application and requires prosecutors to notify victims of their disposition decision — whether to indict or not — without delay. These articles ensure victims are kept informed and heard throughout the process. The Crime Victims Protection Act of 2005 is Koreas comprehensive victim rights statute. It establishes the overall framework for victim rights, including the right to information and participation. Most importantly for todays audience, Article 16 establishes the State Criminal Injury Relief Fund under which the state pays compensation directly to victims or their bereaved families when full recovery from the offender is not possible. The third law in the upper is Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition of Legal Proceedings. Articles 25 of this Act creates the compensation order system. This is a unique feature of Korean criminal procedure the criminal court itself can order the defendant to pay compensation to the victim in the same criminal judgment, without requiring the victim to file a separate civil lawsuit. Once final, this order has the same enforcement force as a civil court judgment. This saves victims enormous time and legal costs. Now I would like to turn to the three laws in the lower row, which deal with asset confiscation and recovery. To understand Koreas system, it is important first to understand the baseline rule, and then see how two special laws modify it. The starting point is Article 48 of the Criminal Act — Koreas general confiscation provision, which applies to all crimes. Under this article, the court may confiscate instruments of crime and proceeds of crime. However, it is a discretionary provision — the court may confiscate, not shall. Critically, Article 48 contains no special provision for victims confiscated assets go to the state treasury. This is the baseline. The two laws in the middle and right boxes are special laws that override Article 48 in specific contexts — and both embed explicit victim protection mechanisms, each working differently. The Act on Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment applies broadly to serious crimes — offences punishable by death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment of three years or more. Under this Act, criminal proceeds may generally be confiscated, or where unavailable, their equivalent value may be confiscated. However, Article 8, paragraph 3 carves out a critical exception where the proceeds constitute crime victim property — property wrongfully taken from a victim — they cannot be confiscated. The state steps back entirely victim property is excluded from seizure and left for the victim to recover directly. The Confiscation and Recovery of Corrupt Assets Act operates on a different logic for specific offences such as fraud, embezzlement, and breach of trust. The key starting point is Article 6, paragraph 1 even where proceeds constitute crime victim property, the state may confiscate them, but only when the victim is unable to recover their loss through direct legal action against the offender. When that condition is met, the state steps in as an intermediary enforcer. Article 6, paragraph 2 then mandates the outcome the confiscated victim property shall be returned to the victim. The mechanism runs victim cannot directly recover → state confiscates → state returns to victim. Taken together, the two Acts pursue the same goal — ensuring criminal proceeds reach victims, not the state or offenders — through structurally distinct routes. The Proceeds Concealment Act says leave victim property alone. The Confiscation and Recovery Act goes further where the victim cannot recover independently, the state actively intervenes and channels the assets back. Both implement the principle underlying UNCAC Articles 34 and 35. Slide 5 Institutional Structure The legal framework is implemented through a structured institutional architecture. At the apex, the Ministry of Justice sets overall policy and manages the Criminal Injury Relief Fund. Below that, three operational pillars deliver services on the ground. The Supreme Prosecutors Office houses the Criminal Asset Recovery Division, established in 2018 specifically to coordinate asset tracing, freezing, and confiscation responses— domestically and internationally. This division has fundamentally changed how we link recovered assets to victim compensation. District Prosecutors Offices each have a dedicated Victim Support Team. These teams are the primary point of contact for victims from the moment a case is reported through to the posttrial stage. They assess needs, arrange services, and coordinate with partner organizations. Crime Victims Support Centers are NGO partners that operate in close coordination with prosecutors offices. They are often the first responders — providing emergency financial support, arranging psychological counseling, and connecting victims with longerterm housing and legal services. These three pillars are supported by specialized units 18 Smile Centers for psychological trauma treatment, a nationwide network of stateappointed counsel providing free legal assistance to victims, and OneStop Protection Teams that coordinate multiagency responses in complex cases. Slide 6 Comprehensive Victim Support Services —Overview Before diving into specifics, let me give you a birds eye view of the six dimensions of support that Korea provides. Financial, psychological, legal, safety, procedural, and integrated coordination. I want to emphasize this is not a menu of optional services that a victim must navigate alone. It is a coordinated package, delivered through a single point of contact, with the prosecutors office acting as the orchestrating hub. Let me take you through each dimension. Slide 7 Financial Support The financial dimension has two components the Criminal Injury Relief Fund for serious cases, and a broader set of direct financial assistance measures. The Criminal Injury Relief Fund provides statebacked compensation when victims cannot recover from perpetrators — because the perpetrator has fled, is insolvent, or the assets have been dissipated. This is a critical backstop. Three categories are covered death, where surviving family members receive ongoing monthly benefits permanent disability, with a lumpsum calculated by disability grade and serious injury, defined as requiring more than two months of treatment with at least one week of hospitalization. Importantly, after the state pays, it does not simply absorb the cost. It exercises what we call subrogation rights — it steps into the victims shoes and pursues the offender for reimbursement. This keeps accountability squarely on the perpetrator. Beyond the compensation fund, prosecutors offices provide direct financial assistance covering medical treatment costs, psychological therapy fees, daily living and subsistence expenses, funeral costs, educational support for dependent children, and relocation expenses when a victim must move for safety reasons. This support begins immediately. A prosecutors office can authorize emergency subsistence payments within days of a crime being reported — no need to wait for the case to reach trial. In major incidents, we have approved and disbursed emergency support on the day families arrived at the prosecutors office. Slide 8 Psychological, Legal Safety Support On psychological support Korea operates 18 Smile Centers across the country, managed by the Ministry of Justice. These are not general mental health clinics — they specialize in trauma recovery for crime victims. Victims receive direct referrals, and the associated treatment costs are covered by the prosecution service. We also fund independent psychological counseling sessions through our designated clinics, and we operate selfhelp programs — art therapy, support groups, healing camps — for longerterm recovery. On legal support Every victim who cannot afford legal counsel is entitled to a stateappointed attorney for victims — free of charge. This is particularly important in complex corruption cases where victims face powerful and wellresourced defendants. For victims with communication challenges, we have a corps of trained statement facilitators who assist during questioning. And for resolution without full trial, we offer criminal mediation — a restorative justice option where offender and victim, with guidance, negotiate a resolution. On safety protection For highrisk victims — those facing threats of witness intimidation or retaliation — we provide GPS wristband location devices linked to police response. All case records can be filed under a pseudonymous name so that personal addresses and contact information are never disclosed through the court process. Where victims must physically leave their homes, we provide shelters and cover relocation expenses. Slide 9 Victim Procedural Rights Victims do not simply receive services — they have active procedural rights throughout the criminal process. Let me trace these across the case lifecycle. During investigation victims must be informed of case status, charges, and prosecution decisions. They have the right to submit evidence and written opinions. Their identity is protected through pseudonymous records in special cases, and emergency financial and medical support begins even before the final indictment. During trial victims may attend hearings and submit impact statements. They have the right to testify with a trusted companion present — whether a family member, a legal representative, or a support worker. Critically, if a defendant is released on bail, the victim must be notified immediately. Also, in Korea, victims can request access either from prosecutors and courts for case records. During sentencing and beyond a Victim Statement Report — a detailed written document prepared by the prosecution — is submitted to the court as a sentencing consideration. Victims may apply for a compensation order within the criminal case itself. And after conviction, they are notified of appeal outcomes and prisoner release dates. Slide 10 UNCAC Alignment Articles 34 and 35 Now I want to address the dimension that I know UNODC is most interested in how does Koreas system implement Articles 34 and 35 of UNCAC. Article 34 — Addressing the consequences of corruption — requires states to take measures to address the harm that corruption causes, including the annulment of corrupt contracts and the taking of remedial action. Korea implements this through several mechanisms. The Confiscation and Return Act gives courts authority to seize and forfeit proceeds of corruption. The Proceeds Concealment Act enables asset tracing through antimoney laundering channels. Contract annulment is available in cases of corrupt public procurement. And perhaps most importantly, Korea established the Criminal Asset Recovery Division in 2018 — a permanent, fullystaffed division at the Supreme Prosecutors Office dedicated exclusively to recovering proceeds of crime. Korea also hosts the secretariat of ARANAP — the Asset Recovery InterAgency Network for Asia and the Pacific — through which we facilitate regional cooperation on crossborder asset recovery. Article 35 — The right of victims to seek compensation — requires states to ensure that entities and persons harmed by corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings for compensation. Koreas implementation is multilayered. Criminal mediation is a precharge process facilitated by trained mediators who are stationed at every Prosecutors Office across Korea. The idea is that before charges are formally filed, the prosecutor can refer an appropriate case to a mediation session. The offender and victim meet — or communicate through the mediator — and reach an agreement. Outcomes can include full or partial monetary compensation, an apology, a commitment to rehabilitation, or restoration of damaged property. If agreement is reached, the prosecutor takes this into account in deciding whether to indict. For the victim, it means direct engagement in the outcome. For the offender, it provides a meaningful incentive to cooperate. This mechanism has particular relevance for cases where a formal criminal prosecution might not be the most efficient or meaningful pathway for victim recovery — especially in cases with personal relationships between offender and victim, or where early settlement is feasible. Compensation orders within criminal proceedings allow victims to obtain civil damages without a separate lawsuit. The Criminal Injury Relief Fund provides a state backstop when offenders cannot pay. And the states subrogation mechanism means that when the public fund compensates, it pursues the offender — ensuring that accountability is never dissolved. Victims can pursue parallel civil litigation. Article 6 of the Confiscation Act explicitly gives victims a priority claim against forfeited assets. The 2023 UNCAC Implementation Review for Korea acknowledged these mechanisms, while also noting areas for continued development —particularly the need to expand nonconvictionbased confiscation and to strengthen preindictment preservation orders. These are active reform areas. Slide 11 Compensation Order The first compensation pathway I want to introduce is Koreas Criminal Compensation Order. The core idea is simple but powerful a victim can receive monetary compensation within the criminal judgment itself, without filing a separate civil lawsuit. How does it work The legal basis is Article 25 of Legal Proceedings Expedition Act. The applicant can be the victim or their legal heir, either by their own application, or the court may issue the order on its own initiative — ex officio. The eligible crimes include bodily harm, assault, sexual offences, theft, fraud, and embezzlement — as well as offences under the Sexual Violence Act and the Child and Youth Protection Act. On burden of proof the victim must specify the damage amount, but the court uses the evidence already gathered in the criminal trial. Once the court issues the order, it is attached directly to the criminal verdict and is immediately enforceable — just like a civil judgment. Strengths This mechanism is genuinely victimfriendly. It is a single proceeding, at minimal cost. Coverage includes material damages, medical expenses, and consolation damages. Key Gap — and I think this is an important discussion point for Indonesia The compensation order is generally not available in complex corruption cases, because the evidentiary issues are too complex to resolve within the criminal proceedings themselves. For such cases, victims are directed to separate civil proceedings— which means higher costs, longer timelines, and often, practical inaccessibility. This gap is particularly relevant for Indonesia. Where corruption victims are diffuse — spread across a community, an affected public — a mechanism like the criminal compensation order in its current Korean form may not be sufficient. A dedicated compensation mechanism may be needed. Slide 12 Confiscation Return Act The Bridge to Victims Now I turn to what I consider the most important structural reform in Koreas victim restitution system — the Confiscation and Return Act. I call it the bridge to victims because it is the mechanism that directly connects asset recovery to victim compensation. The governing principle is this confiscation is permitted only where returning assets directly to victims is practically impossible — and once confiscated, the proceeds are mandatorily returned to victims, not absorbed into the state treasury. This is a fundamental shift in how Korea thinks about asset recovery. Recovery is not a revenue tool for the government. Recovery is victim restoration. Before June 2026 Confiscation of victimowned criminal proceeds was discretionary for specified offences — voice phishing, pyramid and multilevel fraud, and criminal organisation fraud. Prosecutors could pursue confiscation, but were not required to. This created inconsistency in practice. The June 2026 Amendment — what changed Confiscation is now mandatory for those same offences. Prosecutors no longer have discretion — where victimowned proceeds are identified, and victim recovery is impossible, then confiscation must follow. Equally significant is the new presumption of criminal proceeds. Based on timing, value, and surrounding circumstances, assets can be presumed to be criminal proceeds — which meaningfully lowers the burden of proof at the confiscation stage. The key principle I want to leave with you This amendment reflects a philosophical commitment the states role in asset recovery is not selfenrichment. It is to stand in for victims who cannot recover assets themselves, and to return what was taken from them. Slide 13 Asset Recovery to Victim Compensation The Pathway Let me now show you how all the pieces fit together — the endtoend pathway from crime to victim compensation in Korea. This is a fivestage process. Stage 1 — Crime and Asset Identification. From the very start of an investigation, prosecutors work to identify both the offence and the proceeds of that offence. Victim identification begins here too — not after conviction, but at the investigation stage. This earlystart approach is critical to preserving assets before they disappear. Stage 2 — Freezing and Seizure. Once assets are identified, the court issues a preservation order prior to tr ial. Speed matters here — without rapid freezing, assets are dissipated. Koreas dedicated asset recovery units are specifically trained to move quickly at this stage. The problem in corruption cases is that between the time an offence is discovered and the time charges are filed, an offender can — and often does — move or conceal assets. Speed is everything. Police investigating a crime can apply to a prosecutor, who then brings the matter before a court for a preservation order. The scope of assets that can be frozen is broad bank accounts, real estate, vehicles, and —increasingly important — virtual assets such as cryptocurrency. Stage 3 — Confiscation at Trial. Once the case proceeds to indictment, preservation continues automatically, and prosecutors can seek renewed orders as new assets are discovered. The forfeiture judgment is issued as part of the criminal verdict. Koreas system is primarily convictionbased, but — as I mentioned — nonconviction based confiscation is currently being pursued through legislative reform. Stage 4 — Enforcement of the Confiscation Order. The state then traces, freezes, and liquidates the confiscated assets. The proceeds are transferred to the national treasury — but critically, under the Confiscation and Return Act, this is not the end point. Treasury receipt is an intermediate step, not the destination. Stage 5 — Return to Victim. Once the assets are confiscated, the state distributes those proceeds to identified victims. This is the destination. Assets are returned to victims. The state acts as an intermediary. In Korea, district prosecutors’ offices handle the full process from asset recovery to victim restitution, while the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office oversees performance and provides specialized investigative support. Slide 14 Asset Recovery Nominee Transfers Criminal and Civil Response One of the most persistent obstacles in recovering corrupt assets is the use of nominee arrangements — offenders transferring property to family members, associates, or front structures so that, on paper, they appear to own nothing. This is a nearuniversal challenge, and Korea has developed a layered response that operates on two tracks criminal confiscation and, where that falls short, civil litigation. On the criminal side, the Confiscation and Return Act directly addresses nominee transfers through Article 4. Paragraph 1 provides that confiscation can reach assets held by a third party who knowingly received them after the crime — so a person or associate who accepted the transfer with awareness of its criminal origin does not acquire protection simply by holding title. Paragraph 2 goes further even a recipient with no knowledge of wrongdoing cannot keep assets received for free or at a suspiciously low price. Together, these provisions deny offenders the benefit of passing corrupt assets down the chain. However, even a welldesigned criminal statute has limits. In some cases, a court may decline to issue a confiscation order — perhaps because the legal requirements are not fully met, or because the transfer occurred before criminal proceedings were initiated. In other cases, a valuebased confiscation order is issued but proves unenforceable in practice — the defendant has already dissipated or concealed all traceable assets, leaving nothing to execute against. This is where Koreas system takes an additional step that I think will be of particular interest to this audience. When criminal confiscation does not fully reach nominee assets, the State may pursue the same assets through civil litigation, represented by prosecutors, using two mechanisms drawn from general civil law. The first is the creditor subrogation action—where the offender retains a legal right to reclaim property from the nominee but fails to exercise it, the State, as a creditor of the confiscation claim, may step into the offender’s shoes and exercise that right. The second is the creditor revocation action—where the original transfer to the nominee was itself a fraudulent transaction designed to defeat asset recovery, the State may seek a court order reversing that transfer and restoring the asset to the offender’s estate, making it available for confiscation. What this means in practice is that Korea has built a twotier system criminal confiscation as the primary tool, with civil litigation as a backstop when criminal proceedings alone are insufficient. An offender who believes they can protect their proceeds simply by transferring them to a nominee faces exposure on both fronts. This integrated approach reflects the spirit of UNCAC Article 34 — that states must pursue the consequences of corruption through all available legal means, criminal and civil alike. Slide 15 Best Practice Case 1 — Labor Trafficking Delivery Slave Case Now let me turn to our first case. Our first case is labor trafficking. In 2020, a young couple in their midtwenties approached a 23yearold man with an intellectual disability — IQ 66— and befriended him. What followed was a systematic scheme of exploitation that lasted fourteen months. They abducted him, brought him to Jeonju, and forced him to work as a delivery rider. Every month, his wages — approximately 30 million Korean won in total over the period — were extorted from him. They also seized 3 million won in government welfare benefits paid in his name. Throughout this period, he was subjected to repeated physical assaults with dangerous weapons. This case meets the Palermo Protocol definition of trafficking in persons recruitment by deception, coercion through violence and threats, and forced labor for financial exploitation — targeting a person whose intellectual disability made him particularly vulnerable. Victim support the prosecutors office activated the OneStop Solution Center, which coordinated four streams of support simultaneously assistance in obtaining the victims official disability registration certificate and disability allowance — which he had not previously received accompaniment to the Korea Legal Aid Corporation to initiate a civil damages claim against the perpetrators psychological therapy and livelihood and economic assistance. The lesson from this case is the combination of maximum accountability and maximum support delivered at the same time. Charging the most serious available offense, conducting the most thorough possible investigation, while simultaneously ensuring the victim receives every form of practical support he is entitled to — this is what a victimcentered approach looks like in practice. Slide 16 Best Practice Case 2 — Integrated Support Network for Child Victim ⏱ 3 minutes Our second case illustrates the integrated network model in operation. In 2017, a 14yearold girl — I will call her the young victim — was sexually assaulted by an acquaintance of her father. When the case came to the prosecutors office, the team did not simply process a case file. Instead, they immediately activated what we call the Integrated Support Network — a preestablished framework of formal agreements with 15 partner organizations across government, civil society, healthcare, and schools. Within ten days of the report, a multiagency case conference was convened. Around the table were representatives from the prosecutors office, the local government, the childspecialized Sunflower Center — which provides both psychological support and safe interview facilities — the child protection unit, and the Crime Victims Support Center NGO. The conference produced a coordinated response. The Sunflower Center took responsibility for psychological therapy. The local government activated its integrated case management for the family. The prosecution service provided financial support for subsistence and educational expenses. The Crime Victims Support Center arranged emergency housing improvement for the victims residence — which had been identified as vulnerable. And followup monitoring was scheduled across agencies. What makes this case significant is not that any single service was extraordinary — it is the coordination. The young victim and her family did not have to navigate 15 agencies independently. They had one point of contact. Each agency fulfilled its role without duplication. And the prosecutors office served as the coordinating hub throughout the trial process as well, including arranging for a trusted companion to be present during the victims court testimony. This is the OneStop model in action. Slide 17 Best Practice Case 3— Trust Fund for Intellectually Disabled Victim Our third case illustrates what we mean when we say victim support must be creative, not just procedural. In 2018, a perpetrator suffering from severe delusions attacked his mother, killing her, and severely injured his sibling. The surviving victim — I will call her F — had both an intellectual disability and a mental disorder. She was entirely unable to manage her own financial affairs. The prosecution approved victim compensation of approximately 104 million Korean won — roughly USD 77,000. But here was the problem family members had already been misappropriating Fs existing assets. A standard bank transfer would have simply placed those funds at risk. The prosecution team recognized that simply paying compensation was not enough. So they did something unprecedented in Korean legal history. First, they petitioned the family court to appoint a nonprofit organization — an NGO specializing in disability rights — as Fs legal guardian. Second, they structured the compensation payment as conditional the funds would only be disbursed upon establishment of a formal trust fund managed by a licensed bank, with the nonprofit guardian as the authorized representative. The family court granted both applications in March 2019. The trust fund was established with the bank, and F received her compensation in a way that ensured longterm professional management, protection from exploitation, and a legally enforceable governance structure. This was the first case in Korea where courtappointed guardianship and bank trust were combined as a condition of victim compensation payment. It became a national model for protecting intellectually disabled and mentally ill crime victims. The lesson sometimes operationalizing Article 35 requires creative legal engineering, not just a payment. Slide 18 Koreas OneStop Victim Protection Model The OneStop model has six defining features, all visible on this slide. A single entry point. A customized needs checklist covering more than twenty support categories. A formal integrated network with MOUs covering multiple partner organizations per district. Continuous monitoring from day one through postrelease. A dual subrogation mechanism ensuring accountability remains with offenders. And dedicated protocols for special populations — children, elderly, disabled persons, foreign nationals, and victims of digital crimes. This model did not emerge fully formed. It was built incrementally over 35 years, through legislation, through case experience, and through prosecutorlevel innovation that was then institutionalized. The cases you just saw were not accidents — they represent a system designed to enable that kind of response. Slide 19 Challenges and Ongoing Reforms No system is perfect, and Koreas victim support framework is no exception. This slide outlines four areas where we continue to face challenges — and the reforms currently underway to address them. The first is asset recovery. Koreas confiscation system remains convictionbased, meaning assets can only be formally seized after a guilty verdict. To address this, bills introducing nonconvictionbased confiscationwe call this independent confiscation, are currently under legislative review. Under current law, confiscation requires a criminal conviction. This means that if a suspect flees the country, dies before trial, or cannot be identified — common scenarios in organized corruption — no confiscation order can be issued, and victims receive nothing. The proposed independent confiscation system would allow a court to issue a confiscation order against assets — without a parallel indictment. The court would act on the strength of the asset evidence alone. The target crimes include voice phishing, online gambling, and largescale corruption. Legislation is being prepared, with strong support from the Supreme Prosecutors Office. I mention it here because it represents a structural reform option that Indonesia may wish to consider. There is another issue that deserves attention. Combined with the reduced investigative scope following the 2022 prosecutorial reform, this has constrained prosecutors ability to preserve assets at an early stage before they are dissipated. We are working on restoring prosecutorial powers to preserve assets during investigation. The second is the compensation gap. As I mentioned earlier, Koreas state compensation fund and prosecutors economic support are designed for victims of physical harm crimes — homicide, assault, sexual violence. Victims of property crimes such as fraud or illegal private lending fall entirely outside both systems. This is a recognised gap. On the reform side, for illegal private lending, while direct state restitution to victims is not yet available, Korea has taken the significant step of voiding antisocial loan contracts by law — nullifying both principal and interest — effective July 2025. For telecommunications fraud victims, there is active legislation under debate that would impose mandatory nofault liability on banks, requiring financial institutions to compensate victims regardless of whether the bank itself was at fault. The third challenge is international cases. Foreign victims and crossborder asset recovery involve complex jurisdictional and procedural hurdles. Korea is actively working to address this we host the secretariat of the Asset Recovery Network for Asia and the Pacific — ARANAP — and have concluded 33 bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties. We are also expanding cooperation frameworks to allow assistance even without reciprocity guarantees in certain cases. On international cooperation Korea has invested significantly in building the architecture for crossborder asset recovery. Since January 2025, we participate in Interpols Silver Notice system, which enables coordinated asset tracing across over 80 member states. In December 2025, we established an interagency task force specifically for transnational crime — bringing together seven government agencies under a unified command. We also coordinate through APICC, the AsiaPacific Information and Coordination Centre for combating drug crime, which Korea leads, and ADLOMICO, the annual AntiDrug Liaison meeting we have ho sted since 1989. These platforms are available for engagement by Indonesia and other ASEAN partners. Finally, awareness and access. Many victims — particularly vulnerable groups such as elderly or lowincome individuals — are simply unaware that support is available to them. The OneStop Support Teams address this proactively by reaching out rather than waiting for victims to apply. We have also introduced digital checklists for frontline officers and expanded victim outreach through police channels so that support is offered at the earliest point of contact. In summary, Korea is candid about the gaps that remain, and the reforms I have described reflect an ongoing commitment to building a more complete and equitable victim support system. Slide 20 Key Takeaways Let me close with six recommendations that we believe are most directly applicable for jurisdictions building these systems. One — Enshrine victim rights in foundational law. A constitutional guarantee transforms victim support from a discretionary policy into an enforceable right. This creates accountability. Two — Build a statebacked compensation safety net. Lengthy and complex criminal proceedings often leave victims waiting years for resolution by the time a case concludes, the harm has compounded far beyond the original damage. A government compensation fund that pays first and recovers later is essential. Three — Link asset recovery directly to victim compensation. Recovered assets must flow to victims, not simply to government revenue. Compensation orders and priority claims against forfeited assets are the key legal tools. Four — Designate a clear institutional coordinator. Fragmentation kills victim support. One agency must own the coordination role. In Korea, this is the prosecutors office. It could be a different institution in other jurisdictions — but there must be one. Five — Adopt the OneStop model with formal agreements. Multiagency MOUs create enforceable coordination. This can begin at the district level — it does not require a national rollout to be effective. Six — Protect vulnerable victims with special mechanisms. Standard systems will fail children, disabled persons, and foreign nationals. As our trust fund case illustrates, creative legal engineering is sometimes necessary — and entirely possible within existing law. Slide 21 What could Indonesia Adopt Let me summarise what I believe is most transferable from Koreas experience to Indonesias situation. First, on confiscation procedures — the establishment of dedicated crime proceeds recovery units within the prosecution service is achievable and highimpact. Koreas experience shows that even nonspecialist prosecutors produced significantly better results once they were given the mandate and the tools. Dedicated units magnify this effect substantially. Second, on victims and asset recovery — the Confiscation and Return Acts model of mandatory confiscation followed by direct victim distribution is highly transferable. The key policy decision is simple but profound recovered assets should go to victims, not to the treasury by default. Third, on the independent confiscation proposal — this is a mediumterm reform with significant institutional preconditions. But it is worth studying, particularly given Indonesias experience with defendants who flee jurisdiction or die before trial. Fourth, on compensation access — the criminal compensation order mechanism is a powerful tool for individual victims, but its current limitation to noncomplex crimes means it may need adaptation for corruptionspecific contexts. Fifth, on institutional fragmentation — Koreas interagency task force model and onestop victim support system are practical answers to the coordination problem that the morning sessions have identified as central to Indonesias challenges. Slide 22 Thank You QA Thank you. Koreas journey from treating victims as forgotten parties to placing them at the center of criminal justice has taken more than thirtyfive years of sustained legislative, institutional, and prosecutorial commitment. We have not perfected it — but we have learned an enormous amount along the way. The most important insight I can offer is this victim support is not a social welfare program sitting beside the criminal justice system. It is a core function of justice itself. When perpetrators of corruption escape accountability while victims receive nothing, public trust in institutions collapses — and corruption thrives in that vacuum. I am delighted to take your questions, and I am happy to go deeper on any aspect of Koreas system that is relevant to Indonesias reform agenda. Thank you.