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Constructing the discourse of security in Central Asia The presentation will discuss the mechanisms of constructing the discourse of security in Central Asian countries. Arguments concerning radicalism as a threat not only to physical security but also to collective identity, language, culture, and national unity have become key elements of the official rhetoric of all the countries studied in the region. The presidents of Central Asian countries have sought to monopolize the interpretation of both religious and national identity, presenting the state as the main guarantor of their “authenticity” and permanence. In this way, national identity was constructed from above—as a tool for uniting society around a secular, centralized project and as a barrier against external and internal differences of opinion. State religious policy combined bureaucratic control over believers with the active imposition of norms aimed at creating loyal, apolitical citizens. Secularized forms of religiosity and specific forms of secularism were equated with national stability and presented as a counterweight to “foreign” and dangerous political Islam. Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and heightened geopolitical tensions, the concept of security has taken on a new meaning. Regional elites have begun to more actively emphasize sovereignty, cultural uniqueness, and the need for an independent path of development, distancing themselves from both Western and Russian narratives. In this way, the security discourse is closely linked to the processes of reinterpreting national identity and the international positioning strategies of Central Asian states. When analyzing the security discourse of Central Asian states, it is also worth looking at the colonial experience component. The security discourse shaped during the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union did not end with independence. The security structures formed at that time – authoritarian management style, suspicion towards ones own society, dependence on the metropolis in defining threats – have been maintained. The ruling elite in Central Asian countries often inherits the colonial logic of security, using it to suppress opposition and legitimize their power. Security is not a neutral or universal category – it is part of a broader strategy of power. Colonial powers constructed the security discourse in an instrumental way, subordinating it to the goals of control, exploitation, and legitimization of their presence in the colonies. Security did not primarily refer to local communities, but to the protection of the empire’s interests – territorial, economic, and administrative. 1. Security as legitimization of domination Colonial authorities presented their presence as a “civilizing mission,” one of whose main goals was to ensure order and security in “wild,” “unstable,” or “violenceprone” areas. Colonial violence was therefore often presented as necessary and preventive. In this way, colonizers created a narrative according to which their intervention was a response to alleged chaos, inability to govern themselves, and internal threats among indigenous communities. 2. Production of “internal threats” The colonial security discourse was based on categorizing the local population as a potential threat. Much attention was paid to constructing national and religious identities in a dichotomous manner as “good”—submissive—and “bad”—with the potential to resist imperial domination. Anticolonial uprisings, forms of resistance, and even religious and cultural organizations were portrayed as destructive forces that needed to be suppressed for the greater good. As a result, the local population was constantly under surveillance, and any act of dissent was framed within the broader context of “colonial security.” 3. Security as a civilizational discourse The colonial discourse on security was also linked to European ideas of progress and modernization. Colonizers justified their actions as necessary to “discipline” the local population and introduce “modern” institutions. Security was linked to urbanization, administrative reforms, and education—but these measures were selective and subordinated to the logic of exploitation rather than genuine emancipation. 4. The legacy of colonial security discourse The security discourse shaped during the colonial era did not end with the independence of the Central Asian states. Despite the absence of major armed conflict and the low number of terrorist acts compared to neighboring regions1, Central Asia is perceived in the security discourse as a region where radical and extremist Islam is present2. Islam The threat posed by the region’s own citizens was said to be evidenced by their religiosity and historical experience of rebel movements such as the Basmachi. Parallels between historical processes and contemporary events were supposed to indicate that in the current situation, as in the past, the sociopolitical activity of the local population is hostile, financed from abroad, and its ultimate goal is to build a caliphate throughout Central Asia, meaning a return to savagery, brutality, and backwardness. According to this argument, only decisive intervention by local authorities and the involvement of world powers will prevent the region from becoming a hotbed of terrorism. Edward Lemon 2022, Alexander Cooley and John Heathershaw 2017, J. Heathershaw and David Montgomery 2014 point to the contradiction between the very few social facts and the discursive construct of a “Central Asian Islamic threat” to the world order promoted by various groups. Nationalism In Central Asian states, claims to power, with varying degrees of intensity, draw on nationalist themes based on Soviet primordialist constructs. Constructed genealogies derive the present from past ties, which, due to tradition and eternity, sanctify and ennoble current loyalties. Foundational myths, as a kind of legitimizing tradition, remained closely linked to nationalism Calhoun, 2007 Hobsbawm, Ranger, 2008 Smith, 2009. As narratives about great deeds, historical figures, and eternal values, they allowed analogies to be drawn with the present, and thus symbolic links to be established between those in power and objects of collective memory. Russias armed aggression against Ukraine, which began in 2014 and escalated on February 24, 2022, into a fullscale invasion of Ukraine, became a geopolitical turning point, forcing Central Asian countries to take a stand. This is not about the awkward question of which side of the conflict they officially declare their support for. Rather, it is about a forced shift in the perception of nation, religion, independence, and sovereignty. This also applies to the revision of colonial heritage in the construction of the definition of threat and, consequently, attempts at independence in determining security policy. Here I would like to cite the case of Kazakhstan, which is the only country in Central Asia that directly borders Russia and has the largest percentage of Russian population 15.2 in 2023. See Демографиялық статистика 2003. After Russias annexation of Crimea, President Vladimir Putin responded provocatively to a question about rising nationalist sentiment in Kazakhstan at the Seliger youth forum in late August 2014. He referred to Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had “accomplished a unique feat” because he created a state on territory where there had never been a state before. The Kazakhs never had their own state, and he created it. In this sense, he is a unique person in the postSoviet space and in Kazakhstan Путин, 2014. The erasure of the centuriesold history of Kazakh khanates and khans provoked a strong reaction among the Kazakh community. In response, N. Nazarbayev announced the celebration of the 550th anniversary of statehood in 2015, referring to the Kazakh Khanate established by Kerey and Zhanbek in 1465 Laruelle, 2021, pp. 159160. As a result, throughout 2015, state institutions initiated, among other things, historical and cultural events they organized scientific conferences, historical and literary evenings, opened exhibitions, financed concerts, competitions, tournaments, contests, and published books dedicated to the 550th anniversary of the Kazakh Khanate. After 2014, Kazakhstan strengthened the promotion of national messages that can trigger patriotic feelings. Open discussions are increasingly being held on sensitive topics concerning not only the past, such as Russian colonialism, Soviet repression, and the famine of the 1930s Laruelle, 2021, pp. 152167. They are also interested in the current position of the Kazakh authorities towards Russian aggression in Ukraine, territorial integrity, and state sovereignty. Kazakh attempts to distance themselves from their northern neighbor have been accompanied by Russian information attacks carried out by officials, MPs, and media representatives. In December 2020, State Duma deputy Vyacheslav Nikonov stated on Channel One that “Kazakhstan simply did not exist … the territory of Kazakhstan is a great gift from Russia and the Soviet Union.” The theme was then taken up by another State Duma deputy, Yevgeny Fedorov 2020. On the YouTube channel Belrusinfo, he emphasized that the territories were a gift to Kazakhstan, which was to lease some of the territories and was obliged to return them after leaving the USSR. He also spoke in favor of “restoring a united state with Kazakhstan” Fedorov, 2020. In March 2021 Vladimir Medinsky, an advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation 2012–2020, in his speech to the deputies of the Federation Council, encouraged them to consider “how it happened that the lands of Greater Russia ended up on the territory of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and even Belarus” Литвинова, Черных, 2021, p. 5. In April 2022, two months after Russias fullscale invasion of Ukraine, Russian TV presenter Tigran Keosayan 2022 spoke negatively about Kazakhstan, whose authorities refused to organize a Victory Day parade on May 9, 2022. He warns that Kazakhstan may suffer the same fate as Ukraine if it does not take the expected position. Kazakhstan is systematically attacked by representatives of the Russian authorities. They have undermined its territorial integrity and state sovereignty, and even threatened it with a Ukrainian scenario. The reactions of the Kazakh authorities, such as condemning the incitement of strife, issuing a note with an official position, or declaring selected representatives of the Russian Federation persona non grata, are not satisfactory to Kazakh national activists. They express their distrust of the ruling elite, accusing them of dependence on Russia or even collaboration e.g., Гиперборей 2023. According to them, the proRussian stance ensures that the authorities can maintain authoritarian rule in Kazakhstan. Hence, the Kazakh authorities were doing too little to defend the countrys independence and Kazakh identity. The natural consequence of this forced redefinition is tension around national identity and loyalty. Some Kazakhs supported Russias aggression against Ukraine, much to the disappointment of national patriots. This has sparked a debate on how the divisions between “us” and “them” should be drawn in the context of war and a possible threat from Russia. Participants in the debate point to the unreliability of equating national identity with state loyalty. They thus challenge the governments primordialist narrative, in which nationality serves to legitimize or naturalize the current configuration of political power. Instead, they propose a new perspective on being “one of us” or “one of them,” which is based not on ethnicity but on a choice of values. Russias aggression against Ukraine has accelerated the spread of decolonial discourse. More and more people are beginning to question the colonial narrative of security and engage in the creation of an alternative national narrative and security discourse. As a result, the image of Russia as an altruistic state devoted to nonRussian entities is being destroyed. 1 The last major armed conflict in Central Asia was the civil war in Tajikistan, the main fighting of which ended in 1996 see The Uppsala Conflict Database Project. 2 According to the University of Marylands Global Terrorism Database, between 2001 and 2020, only 0.06 of global terrorist attacks took place in Central Asia see Global Terrorism Database.