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1. Th e question of existence Why does anything exist Th ere are atoms. Th ere are planets. Th ere is you. Why are there any of these things Why not instead just nothing at all Th e purpose of this chapter is to help you investigate a possible answer. 1 Given the topic of this book, you might expect me to argue that God is the answer— i.e., God explains why anything exists. However, this answer has a puzzling consequence. God cannot explain existence unless God already exists . Th is explanation appears circular. If we want to know why something exists, curiosity typically draws our attention to a broader context. For example, if we wish to understand why a particular fi re exists, we might search for a cause of the fi re. Th e cause of the fi re is not the fi re itself the cause is something else , like a match or lightning strike. In the absence of a broader context that could help us see why something exists, the original mystery seems to remain. I will seek to shed light on the mystery of existence in two stages. In the fi rst stage, I will show how certain principles of explanation suggest that there is a foundational layer of reality, which exists without any outside explanation. In the second stage, I will investigate the nature of this foundation in particular, I will consider how a foundation could be relevantly diff erent from everything else that has an outside explanation, and how we may thereby avoid the problem of circularity. In the end, we will arrive at what may be the ultimate explanation of everything. 2. Why ask why Asking why is one of the most powerful tools for investigating any topic. I will show how we can use the question— why —to investigate an explanation of everything. I begin with a simple “why” principle explain as much as you can . Th is principle will guide our entire inquiry. Let us unpack the “why” principle. I off er what I call “the Principle of Explanation” PE, which is one modest translation of the “why” principle For any fact F , if an explanation of F is possible, then an explanation of F is expectable, other things being 1 Th e Argument from Contingency Joshua Rasmussen 17 18 Contemporary Arguments in Natural Th eology equal. Th is principle is relatively modest as far as principles of explanation go. PE is more modest than the classic Principle of Suffi cient Reason PSR. PSR says that everything whatsoever has a suffi cient reason explanation or cause. 2 By contrast, PE doesn’t require that much. Instead, PE expresses a presumption to expect an explanation in other words, explain as much as you can. Five clarifi cations are in order. First, when I say some explanation is expectable, I don’t mean that someone probably knows the explanation. Some explanations may be entirely unknown. For example, it could be that there is ash on the ground because there was a fi re, even while no one knows that there was a fi re. So I’m thinking of explanations as part of the world—perhaps awaiting discovery. Second clarifi cation I am thinking of explanations as expressible in terms of propositions . So, for example, the proposition that there was a fi re may explain the fact true proposition that there is ash on the ground . If we say the fi re itself explains the ash, I understand this talk to be shorthand. I’ll say an explanation is real actually obtains if the proposition that expresses it is true. 3 Th ird, an explanation, as I am thinking of it, provides some illumination of why or how something is the case without circularity. When I say the explanation is not circular, I mean that at least part of the explanation is external to not wholly included in the fact to be explained. I leave to the side the prospect of other notions of “explanation” that allow for circularity. Example a theory of common ancestry helps illuminate—and so explains to some extent—why genetic similarities exist. For our purposes, we may say that where F is a fact of the form the xs exist , an external explanation of F is in terms of at least one thing that is not among those same xs . For example, an external explanation of the fact that the turtles exist is not entirely in terms of those same turtles. Fourth, by “expectable,” I mean a positive degree of expectation what philosophers sometimes call “epistemic” probability. For example, if someone tosses a sixsided die, and if all sides look equal in size, then you can expect a 16 probability expectation that the die lands on a given side. In the same way, the expectation in PE is an expectation of a further explanation in light of the record of actual explanations one knows about. Fift h and fi nally, the principle allows for exceptions. It says that an explanation is expectable other things being equal . In this way, PE can expose a reason in support of some explanation, while leaving open whether one may have counterbalancing reasons. Th e discovery of reasons to think something is true is itself an important part of the discovery of truth. Now that we have some preliminaries out of the way, I will share a few reasons I think PE can help us extend sight. First, PE successfully predicts many observations. In this respect, PE is like the law of gravity. Th e law of gravity successfully predicts the many cases of gravitational attraction. Similarly, PE successfully predicts the many cases of explanation. Successful prediction provides evidential support for the theory. Note that evidential support is open to defeat . For example, suppose we found a special massive object that defi es gravity. Th en we may have reason to restrict the law of gravity. Similarly, if one has reason to think that PE fails to apply to a particular item, then that reason may motivate an exception. Still, even if we found some weird object, that wouldn’t undermine the presumptive application to most other objects. Th e Argument from Contingency 19 Consider, moreover, that science succeeds by seeking deeper explanations of observations. Without something like PE, it is unclear how scientifi c practice could have a solid footing, for scientifi c investigation relies on at least the presumption that there is a further, outside explanation for a given phenomenon while we might not yet know what it is. Suppose, instead, there is no presumption of any explanation. Th en for any given observations, there is no presumption of an explanation of those observations. In that case, every scientifi c explanation would be suspect. Th e ramifi cations go beyond science. Without PE, it’s not even clear how you could infer that anything exists outside your head. For suppose there is no presumption to expect an explanation. Th en why expect any external explanation of your existence or inner experiences You might just as likely be randomly hallucinating. Now to be clear, I am not suggesting that you must fi rst explicitly believe PE to believe that particular things have an explanation. Rather, I think you can begin by directly witnessing clear cases of explanations, such as that your current thoughts have an explanation in terms of previous thoughts. Th ese clear cases then provide a basis for inferring a more general principle, which is implicit in ordinary and scientifi c reasoning. Here is a fi nal, reasonbased consideration that may also support PE. One may have a direct, intuitive sense that truths, in general, have an explanation. To trigger that sense, take any arbitrary proposition p out of a hat. Suppose p is true . We can wonder why is p true Why not false One’s very curiosity refl ects the sense that there is likely some explanation, whatever it might be. At this point, it may help to sketch the sorts of explanations that might be available in general. So take any true proposition p . Proposition p is either contingent i.e., not necessarily true or necessarily false or necessary . Suppose, fi rst, p is contingent. Th en an explanation of p could be in terms of prior causes or tendencies. For example, the fact that there are sheep is explicable in terms of a causal history leading to the fi rst sheep. Next, suppose p is necessary not contingent. In that case, here are three options i the fact that p is necessary is a reason to think p cannot have an explanation ii p has an explanation in terms of more fundamental necessary truths or iii p is selfexplanatory or explained by the fact that it is necessary if we put aside the external explanation requirement. In light of these options, one could theoretically hold that every fact has some explanation, either in terms of prior causes or conditions if it is contingent or in terms of itself if it is necessary. 4 For our purposes, we may leave these and other 5 options open. To review, PE invites us to explain things as far as we can. Why To illuminate our world. Th e twin lights of reason and experience testify to the illuminating power of explanations. Explanations empower scientifi c inquiry. Explanations help you see that there is an external world. And, as we will consider next, explanations may help us uncover the nature of ultimate reality. 3. Th e foundation theory Th e next step is to use the “why” tool to investigate reality as a whole. Suppose we call reality as a whole all things included, “the blob of everything.” Th e blob of everything 20 Contemporary Arguments in Natural Th eology is strange in a way, for nothing beyond the blob explains or causes the blob since there is nothing beyond the blob. But how can any blob—of any size or shape—exist without any outside cause or outside explanation I off er for your consideration the beginning of an answer. I propose that a blob can exist without any outside cause or explanation if that blob includes some foundational nondependent layer. Th is foundation is the bedrock layer of existence. Nothing causes the foundation to exist. Th e foundation exists on its own—independently of any outside cause or outside explanation. I call the theory that the blob of everything includes a foundation, “Th e Foundation Th eory.” I will motivate this proposal by off ering two related reasons to think that there is a basic, necessary portion of reality capable of being a foundation for contingent i.e., nonnecessary things. Th e fi rst reason uses the Principle of Explanation PE in support of the fi rst stage of a classic Argument from Contingency . Th e second reason is a contemporary argument from possible explanations. Start with the Argument from Contingency stage 1 1 Something exists. 2 If everything is contingent, then there is no external explanation of the contingent things of why there are the contingent things there are . 3 Th ere is an external explanation of the contingent things. 4 Th erefore, not everything is contingent. from 2 and 3 5 Th erefore, something is noncontingent. from 1 and 4 6 Th erefore, something has necessary existence. Let us examine each premise. Start with 1 something exists. By “exists,” I do not mean anything fancy. I mean that there are things , whatever they might be. Even if everything is an illusion, then illusions exist . Why believe anything exists Here’s why you can see that something exists via your direct awareness of existing things. For example, you are aware of your thoughts. Your awareness of your thoughts is your clearest way of knowing that your thoughts exist. I do not assume anything about the nature of the things that exist. If everything is an illusion, then at least the illusions exist. If we suppose instead that nothing exists, then no one exists. If no one exists, then there is no one for me to convince. Th ere are no words here. Th ere are no thoughts. Th ere is no you. But there are words, there are thoughts, and there is you. Th erefore, something exists. Next, consider premise 2 if everything has contingent existence, then there is no external explanation of the contingent things. A contingent thing is something that doesn’t have necessary existence. So the premise says that if nothing has necessary existence, then there is no external explanation of the fact that there are the contingent nonnecessary things that there are. Principle 2 follows from the intended meaning of “explanation,” which goes beyond what is to be explained. In this case, what is to be explained is the fact that there are the contingent things that there are . If we want to know why there are these contingent things, an external explanation will not be entirely in terms of those very same things. Th e Argument from Contingency 21 Any explanation in terms of contingent things presupposes the very thing we are trying to explain these very contingent things. Th erefore, an external explanation of the contingent things of the fact that they all exist will ultimately be in terms of something that is not contingent. Th is inference doesn’t depend upon the length of the chain of contingent things I’ll say more about the prospect of an infi nite chain in section 5. 6 Note the term “the contingent things” refers to all the contingent things using plural reference. 7 Th at is to say, the term “the contingent things” refers to the plural of all contingent things at all times and all places. 8 In referring to the contingent things, I do not assume that they compose a single Big Contingent Th ing, over and above the individuals. In the same way, by referring to ten children, I’m not saying those ten children compose a big child. Turn to premise 3 there is an external explanation of the contingent things. Our explanationseeking tool PE exposes a reason in support of 3. According to PE, for any given fact f , if an explanation of f is possible, some explanation is expectable other things being equal, where the notion of “explanation” in view is external. In this case, f the fact that there are the contingent things that there are. According to PE, then, we can expect an external explanation of this fact. I am assuming it is a fact that there are contingent things. If instead there are no contingent things, then everything is a necessary thing. In that case, the conclusion of the fi rst stage of the Argument from Contingency is true, and we may then skip ahead to section 6. Before moving on, I want to emphasize again that PE is quite modest. Th e principle merely invites us to seek an explanation as far as we can. If there is an exception a fact with no external explanation, then perhaps that fact is special. We can identify special exceptions if we have suffi cient reason. In any case, PE is at least a reason in support of 3, which one may weigh in the balance. Moreover, in the absence of a counterbalancing reason to think that a given fact admits of no further explanation, one has no reason to treat the given fact as diff erent from every other fact that has a further explanation. In other words, you may explain facts as far as you can. Let us recap the argument. Th e key idea is that contingent things have some explanation. To avoid circularity, an explanation of all the contingent things will not be solely in terms of contingent things on the relevant notion of “explanation”. If that is right, then some noncontingent thing is part of the total explanation of contingent things. Since a noncontinent thing is by defi nition a necessary thing, it follows that there is a necessary thing maybe there are many necessary things, but there is at least one. Th is result has farreaching ramifi cations, as we shall see in section 6. It will be useful, therefore, to reexamine our steps before we continue. In the next section, I will off er another argument for the same result. Th en, in section 5, we will examine some objections. 4. An argument from possible explanations A more recent type of argument from contingency seeks to display a link between possible causes or possible explanations and a necessary thing capable of causing or grounding contingent things. 22 Contemporary Arguments in Natural Th eology Here is one such argument, what I will call “Th e Argument from Possible Explanations” APE 9 1 Every contingent state could possibly have some external explanation. 10 2 If no necessary thing is possible, then some contingent state couldn’t possibly have an external explanation. 3 Th erefore, some necessary thing is possible. 4 A necessary thing is either impossible or necessary. 5 Th erefore, some necessary thing is necessary. 6 Th erefore, there is a necessary thing at least one. 11 I will suggest a potential justifi cation for each premise. First a clarifi cation I use the term “could possibly” to convey consistent with the truths of reason—i.e., the truths one can see to be true via rational refl ection a priori . Truths of reason include, for example, truths of mathematics and logic, like 1 1 2. Next, when I say a proposition is consistent with reason, I mean the proposition doesn’t contradict any truth of reason. Th is notion of “possibility” is very broad. It is broader than physical possibility—i.e., consistency with what physical things actually exist. Th ere might be physically impossible things that are still logically possible e.g., it may be physically impossible for you to travel faster than the speed of light, but there’s nothing logically impossible about that. A priori possibility may also be broader than what is called “ metaphysical possibility”—i.e., consistency with whatever is ontologically necessary. 12 Th e broadness of the notion I have in mind contributes to the modesty of 1. Th is premise says merely that no principle of reason rules out a scenario in which every contingent state could—consistent with reason—have an external explanation. In view of the modesty of 1, I suspect you might fi nd 1 quite plausible in its own right— perhaps selfevident. In any case, one might also motivate principle 1 via examples. Principle 1 successfully predicts many cases of possible explanations without appealing to anything adhoc or weird. In particular, 1 predicts that it is possible for there to be an explanation of your current thoughts. An explanation of your thoughts is surely possible. Th erefore, 1’s prediction here is successful. As far as I am aware, there are no counterexamples to 1 and no simpler, competing principle with as much predictive success. I leave it to the reader to consider possible exceptions. As with any principle, 1 is open to defeat, at least in principle. Th us, for example, if you have some reason to think that some contingent state couldn’t have any explanation, then that reason may defeat 1, at least with respect to that case. In the interest of modesty, we may treat 1 as a rule of thumb at least so for any given contingent state, one may expect that state to at least possibly have an external explanation, absent a suffi cient reason to think otherwise. Next, consider premise 2 there is some contingent state that couldn’t possibly have an external explanation unless some necessary thing is possible. Here’s a reason for 2. Let C the state of there being the contingent things there are and no others . C is contingent since C would fail to obtain if any contingent cause failed to exist. So Th e Argument from Contingency 23 suppose C could possibly have an explanation. To avoid circularity, the explanation will not be solely in terms of those same contingent things instead, the explanation will be in terms of something noncontingent that could produce or cause contingent things. In other words, if C could possibly have an external explanation, then there could possibly be a necessary thing capable of producing or causing contingent things. If that much is correct, we may then complete the argument as follows. A necessary thing is the sort of thing that is either necessary or impossible —premise 4. A necessary thing is not impossible—given 3. It follows that a necessary thing is necessary, and therefore actual. Let us look again at premise 4 a necessary thing is either necessary or impossible. Th is premise is a consequence of a standard logic of possibility. For our purposes, we may treat this logic as orienting us to a relevant defi nition of “necessary thing.” I relegate the technical details to a note at the end of the chapter. 13 We’ve covered a lot of ground. I invite you to review the steps carefully. Test them. See what you can see. To examine additional pathways to a necessary thing that could be a cause of contingent things, see necessarybeing.com or Alexander Pruss and Joshua Rasmussen, Necessary Existence Oxford Oxford University Press, 2018 . 5. Objections I will address six common and instructive objections to the Foundation Th eory. Th is list is only a sample. You may have additional objections. Th e discussion below is an introduction to some of the wider issues at stake. Objection 1 infi nite regress Suppose every contingent thing depends on another contingent thing in an infi nite regress of causes. Th en no foundation is required, or even possible. If every contingent thing already has a complete contingent cause, there is no place in the chain of causes for a necessary thing to participate. Reply Note fi rst that this objection does not target any premise in either of my two arguments for a necessary foundation. Both arguments leave open the prospect of an infi nite chain of causes. No premise says that contingent reality is fi nite. 14 Second, and more fundamentally, the hypothesis that there is an infi nite chain leaves unanswered why that chain exists whether we conceive of the chain as a single thing or as an assemblage of many things. Th e mere infi nity of the chain still leaves something unexplained. To illustrate, suppose you fi nd a hammer in your friend’s garage, and you ask, “Where did this hammer come from” Your friend replies, “Oh, that hammer has always been there.” His answer doesn’t really address your question, since the age of the hammer—even if infi nite—doesn’t by itself ultimately explain the existence of the hammer. 15 24 Contemporary Arguments in Natural Th eology Note that even if a chain of causes is internally explained in some sense by its members, that still doesn’t give us an external explanation. PE invites us to look for external explanations as far as we can to empower science, etc. We can externally explain a chain of contingent things in terms of a noncontingent foundation just as we can externally explain any chain of turtles in terms of more fundamental causes, whether or not the chain is infi nite. 16 I say more about external explanations of infi nite chains in the next objection. Objection 2 the fallacy of composition It is fallacious to suppose that the totality of contingent things is itself contingent. Aft er all, a totality can have diff erent properties from its parts for example, the totality of chickens is not a chicken. Similarly, maybe each contingent thing has a cause, while the totality of contingent things is uncaused. Reply Th e version of the Argument from Contingency in this chapter does not depend upon any inference from parts to wholes. In particular, the Principle of explanation PE equally applies to totalities of any size. To draw out this point, consider the following story. You wake up in an alternative world. In this world, you encounter a forest on a fl at planet that extends out infi nitely. You then overhear some people talking about the origin of the forest. Th eir conversation proceeds like so Philo Where did this forest come from Nihilo Don’t you know Every tree in the forest came from another tree. Th is forest is infi nite. Philo I’ve heard that, Nihilo. But I’m still perplexed. Why have any trees ever come from any other trees Why are there any trees here at all And why these trees Nihilo Explaining each tree suffi ces to explain all the trees. What is there left to explain Philo Th ere’s something left unexplained. I see this giant forest. It’s huge and impressive. But why is it here Why not instead an infi nite series of vines , or turtles , or just nothing at all If you explain a bunch of things by citing the activities of those same things, then the explanation is circular. A circular explanation is as good as no explanation. Nihilo Well, the reason no vines are here is that these trees here take up too much space. 17 Suddenly, out of nowhere, a new infi nite forest appears in the sky. 18 Philo and Nihilo run and hide. Th e End. Th e Argument from Contingency 25 Th is story illustrates a diff erence between explaining individuals e.g., individual trees and explaining groups the forest. Even if each individual tree is somehow explained in terms of another tree, all these individual explanations leave something unexplained. We can still wonder why there is the infi nite forest at all, or why it exists where it does. PE invites us to search for an explanation that goes beyond the very fact to be explained. So, if there is a forest, PE invites an explanation that goes beyond the elements of that same forest. In general, an external explanation of x whether one or many is in terms of something beyond x itself. Note also that the Argument from Possible Explanations depends merely on the possibility of an external explanation. So even if some infi nite forest in the sky could somehow grow up without any external explanation, it wouldn’t thereby follow that contingent things couldn’t have an external explanation. Objection 3 virtual particles Physicists tell us that “virtual” particles can randomly appear without any explanation. If virtual particles appear uncaused, perhaps the entire cosmos came into existence uncaused, without any explanation. Reply Th e fi rst thing to note is that virtual particles don’t literally come from nothing . Virtual particles come from prior states of energy. Next, states of energy can provide a nondeterministic nonnecessitating explanation. For example, if state alpha spontaneously transitions to state beta, and if state alpha had a 15 chance of doing so, then this 15 chance provides some even if slight explanation of the transition. For the purposes of our arguments, even a slight explanation counts as some explanation. Note the explanation need not be contrastive, e.g., an explanation of state alpha rather than state beta. Objection 4 bootstrapping How does a necessary thing produce contingent things It seems the very production of contingent things would itself be contingent because the eff ects are contingent yet uncaused because it is the fi rst production. If something can be contingent and uncaused, why couldn’t the universe simply be contingent and uncaused Reply Th is objection helps us separate diff erent versions of the Argument from Contingency. Some versions rely on the stronger principle that whatever is contingent whether a thing or an act must have a prior cause. Th e arguments in this chapter, by contrast, don’t rely on anything that strong. Instead, I say explain as much as you can . We can explain carrots and castles, for example, in terms of prior activities thus, we can expect an explanation of carrots and castles. Same for contingent things we can explain them in terms of prior 26 Contemporary Arguments in Natural Th eology activities. Moreover, the activities themselves could also have an explanation in terms of a necessary tendency within the necessary thing to nondeterministically produce something. Here is the main point if we explain things as far as we can, that’s enough to expose a reason to think contingent things have an explanation in terms of a necessary thing. Objection 5 the possibility of nothing Th e philosopher David Hume 1779 , 58–59 observes that any existing thing is conceivably nonexistent. For example, I can conceive of a world with no chairs, no trees, and no universe. Th erefore, each thing has the real possibility of not existing. A necessary foundation, however, is supposed to have no possibility of not existing cf. Swinburne 2012 . 19 Reply Hume’s thought does not actually touch our particular arguments. To see why, suppose Hume is right that whatever can be conceived of as existing can be conceived of as not existing. And suppose that a necessary concrete thing N can be conceived of in the relevant sense. Th en either conceivability implies or gives evidence for possibility, or it does not. If conceivability does not provide evidence for possibility, then Hume’s objection fails at the start for then we cannot use conceivability to infer that N ’s nonexistence is possible. So, suppose instead that conceivability provides evidence for possibility. Th en conceivability provides evidence for both the possibility of N and the possibility of no N since both are conceivable if either is. Yet, these can’t both be possible, for we saw that N is either possible or impossible. So, the evidence from conceivability washes out. Either way, then, the objection fails. 20 Objection 6 brute fact Everyone is committed to brute, unexplained facts. Whether you locate bruteness in God or in the universe, something must be ultimate. So why couldn’t the universe be the brute, ultimate reality Reply Th is objection invites us to consider the next stage of the Argument from Contingency. Th e Argument from Contingency has two stages. We have only seen the fi rst stage, which is an argument for the existence of a necessary foundation. Th e second stage seeks to identify the nature of the foundation. We will turn to the second stage next. 6. Can we say more What else might we say about a necessary foundation I will seek to show that if there is a necessarily existent portion of reality that could be a foundation for contingent Th e Argument from Contingency 27 things, this necessary portion has the following attributes i independent existence, ii eternal existence, iii nonlimited nature, iv unsurpassable power, and iv a supreme nature. To begin, let n refer to the totality of whatever exists necessarily including any mathematical objects and other abstracta , if there are any. I shall now give a series of arguments to shed light on some attributes of n . I will construct all my arguments using conceptual analysis and the Principle of Explanation PE. 6.1. Independent existence By “independent existence”, I mean that n ’s existence doesn’t depend on any prior reality whether prior in time or in existence. Here is an argument for n ’s independent existence 1 n is the totality of whatever is necessary by defi nition. 2 No necessary reality is prior to the totality of all necessary reality. 3 No contingent reality is prior to the totality of all necessary reality. 4 Everything is either necessary or contingent. 5 Th erefore, no reality is prior to n . 6 Th erefore, n ’s existence doesn’t depend upon any prior reality. 6.2. Eternal n is eternal in at least this sense n never comes to exist or ceases to exist. Here is my argument for eternal existence 1 Whatever comes to exist or ceases to exist can fail to exist. 2 n cannot fail to exist since n has necessary existence . 3 Th erefore, n cannot come to exist or cease to exist. 4 Whatever cannot come to exist or cease to exist is eternal. 5 Th erefore, n is eternal. For the sake of neutrality, I leave open the nature of time n is eternal on any of the major theories of time. Take eternalism , which is the position that whatever exists at any time also exists simpliciter . If eternalism is true, then n is eternal in at least this sense there is no time at which n began or ceased to exist simpliciter . 21 Another option is presentism whatever exists, exists presently. On this option , n necessarily exists at whatever time is present now, since n necessarily exists. In any case , n cannot come to be or cease to be. 6.3. Nonlimited I begin with a modest proposal n is not a turtle. Perhaps this much is already too obvious. However, seeing why it is not a turtle will help us see other things about n . 28 Contemporary Arguments in Natural Th eology Here is why n is not a turtle 1 Every turtle is dependent. 2 n is independent. 3 Th erefore, n is not a turtle. Premise 1—that every turtle is dependent—is justifi ed by a principle of irrelevant diff erences. Th e principle is that diff erences between turtles size, shape, eating capacity, etc. are irrelevant to account for a diff erence with respect to being dependent on prior conditions. Th erefore, if any turtle depends on a prior condition, every turtle alike is dependent. Someone might reply that perhaps there is simply no relevant diff erence between the explained and the unexplained. Perhaps something could be inexplicably unexplained. However, PE is itself a reason to expect an explanation. PE invites us to explain things as far as we can. If we do, then we will explain all turtles, if we can or we will explain why some turtle is relevantly diff erent from all others. Next, we have premise 2 n is independent. We already saw justifi cation for 2. To review, the independence of n follows from the meaning of terms n refers to the totality of necessary reality. Th ere is nothing prior to all necessary reality. Th erefore, there is nothing prior to n upon which n may depend. In that sense, n is the ultimate anchor for dependent things. Th e reasoning above has additional applications. For example, it applies to cubes . In the absence of a reason to think there is a special, uncaused, necessary cube, the presumption is to treat all cubes alike contingent and dependent. Hence, we have reason to expect that n is not a cube. In general, for any type t , in the absence of a reason to think there is a special, uncaused, necessary instance of t , the presumption is to treat all instances of t alike contingent and dependent. PE amplifi es this reasoning. By the light of PE, we should explain things as far as we can. So, if we can explain an instance of t , we have good reason to do so. We can use this general reasoning to form an argument against positing arbitrary limits , such as in size, shape, powers, or in any other attribute that comes in various degrees. Let us say a thing is limited to some extent if it has some basic attribute i.e., an attribute not grounded in other attributes to some nonmaximal degree, like a fl ower with a fi nite size. Th en we have the following argument against n being limited in its basic nature 1 Whatever is limited like turtles, giraff es, cubes, etc. can have an external explanation. 2 n cannot have an external explanation. 3 Th erefore, n is not limited in its basic nature. Th e most common response to this argument I have received is a question about whether n ’s basic limits might be necessary . Th e thought here is that if n ’s limits hold necessarily, then perhaps they couldn’t have any further explanation. Th e Argument from Contingency 29 Th is proposal, however, requires motivation. To my mind, positing unexplained limits is like supposing some event is an exception to the natural order a miracle. Th eoretically, one could have some reason to posit such an exception. Still, anyone who lacks such a reason is in position to expect a further explanation. Recall the “why” principle explain as much as you can. We can explain limited things. For example, the hypothesis that an unlimited foundation created limited, contingent things would explain the existence of limited things. I leave it to readers to consider whether there may be suffi cient reason to make a special exception in this case. Here, my main point is to draw out the implication of explaining things as far as you can—by the light of PE if you explain things as far as you can, then you will explain limits as far as you can. 6.4. Unsurpassable power We may build on the previous results to expose another attribute n has unsurpassable power, where a power , let’s say, is a potential to produce an eff ect. Here’s my argument 1 n has some power at least to be a possible cause of contingent things. 2 If n ’s power were surpassable, then n would be limited e.g., would have a basic limit in power. 3 n is not limited see 6.3. 4 Th erefore, n ’s power is unsurpassable from 2 and 3. I leave it to the reader to consider the potential implications of unsurpassable power e.g., whether unsurpassable power would include cognitive powers, powers of moral refl ection, etc. 6.5. Supreme Finally, here is a reason to think n is supreme . 1 Whatever is not supreme is limited in some basic respect. 2 Whatever is limited could conceivably have some external explanation. 3 n cannot conceivably have an external explanation. 4 Th erefore, n is supreme. By “supreme”, I mean the quality of being maximal with respect to positive properties. A positive property is a property that contributes to the intrinsic value of a thing. Examples of positive properties include knowledge, power , and goodness . A supreme foundation, then, is something that, in total, has no limit with respect to whatever positive properties it has. Th ere are various questions to consider at this point. Is the concept of “positive” purely subjective, or could there be an objective notion of positive 30 Contemporary Arguments in Natural Th eology property Are there counterbalancing reasons to think that the foundation cannot be supreme What positive properties could the foundation have I deal with these questions in some detail in Rasmussen 2019. 22 Here I set them aside for further inquiry. Instead, I will close this chapter by showing how the hypothesis that the foundation is supreme enables a maximally deep or complete explanation of things. Th e Foundation Th eory provides the beginning of an explanation of at least contingent things. We can still wonder about the nature of the foundation. If the foundation has necessary existence, what sort of thing could have necessary existence Not a turtle. Not a snake. Th en what Th e deepest answer is going to be in terms of something that we can see is relevantly diff erent from dependent, contingent things. So what is relevantly diff erent from dependent, contingent things Th e answer, I propose, is something with a maximally supreme nature. A supreme nature is relevantly diff erent from every other nature that can conceivably have a further explanation. Every nonsupreme, limited thing could conceivably have an external explanation for example, a turtle could have an explanation in terms of causal activities or essential tendencies of n . Something with a supreme nature, by contrast, cannot conceivably have any further explanation. Supremacy itself entails ultimacy. In other words, if n is supreme, we can see why n must be ultimate, foundational, and independent. We can also see why n would have supremely robust existence necessary existence. 23 Note that this proposal also gives us a simple, nonarbitrary account of n ’s basic nature. If the foundation is not supreme, by contrast, then we multiply complexity a theory of a nonsupreme nature will include additional complexity about the details of its particular limits. I conclude this section with an argument that succinctly summarizes both stages of the argument from contingency 1 Without a supreme foundation, the chain of explanations stops inexplicably short. 2 Th e chain of explanations doesn’t stop inexplicably short PE. 3 Th erefore, there is a supreme foundation. 7. Results I note three signifi cant results of our inquiry. First, we saw that reality, in total, has no external explanation since nothing is outside everything. Second, we saw how a foundation of reality within reality could provide an ultimate explanation of everything else. Th ird, we saw how a foundation could provide the most ultimate explanation if it has a supreme nature, since anything less than supreme could conceivably have a further explanation. Th ese results add up to a single, signifi cant result. If you explain things as far as you can, you will arrive at the most supreme explanation possible