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Folkways, on the other hand, are as common as every myriad pattern of regular behavior, from the sequence by which one puts on socks and shoes (both socks first, then both shoes, or one sock and one shoe followed by the second sock and second shoe, assuming two feet and the presence of shoes), to the rules governing a professor's behavior at the front of a lecture hall (stand behind a lectern or pace back and forth, maintain distance from the students or enter their space by patrolling the aisles and stairs while lecturing, clear throat before first speaking or deploy another method of opening the interaction). Mores are norms that are so taken for granted as to be thought basic to nature, human and otherwise; hence, the fear and violence associated typically with reactions to their violation. Folkways, for their part, are norms that regulate superficial and largely inconsequential behavior; hence, the mild amusement and titillation, if not outright indifference, that typically greet their violation. Shame and guilt can follow even the thought of violating mores, whereas folkways tend to loiter in our minds only when called to our attention by “did-you-ever-notice?” comedians. The state of norms in postmodernity remains contested terrain for contemporary sociology. Rational choice theorists, for example, have looked to norms as potential explanation for otherwise seemingly irrational individual behavior. As Hechter and Opp (2001) argue, basic phenomena such as cooperation and collective action, not to mention social order itself, are difficult to explain using only “rational egoistic behavioral assumptions” of the sort typical of rational choice theory. In Bicchieri's (2006) noted account, the power of norms to constrain behavior is tested primarily using game theory simulations, such as Ultimatum, Dictator, Trust, and Social Dilemma. Thus, on the one side there is speculation as to whether certain fundamental norms are inherent and universal in human sociation. Alvin Gouldner (1960) once famously argued that “the norm of reciprocity,” like the incest taboo, was very probably a cultural universal, which meant that guidelines were everywhere and always in some manner in effect that encouraged actors to help, and not harm, those who have helped them. This comes very close to positing a Golden Rule, although sociologically. On the other hand, there is attention to the power of actors to suppress, reject, alter, fabricate, or create spontaneously norms of one or another type and consequence, even with respect to those previously deemed sacred and connected to emotionally entrenched values. For Bicchieri (2007), norms can even “endogenously emerge” as a result of nothing more than the interaction among actors sharing prior dispositions. Alan Wolfe's (1989, 1998) influential sociology seeks to merge these two tendencies in a coherent analysis of contemporary norms. Drawing, for example, on Émile Durkheim and William James, Wolfe (2001) argues that the current century will be “the century of moral freedom,” which is to say, that individuals will increasingly choose their own norms from the plurality of normative systems characteristic of postmodern society, thus setting for themselves their own course toward the true, right, and good. While this proposition may seem out of sync with Durkheim's concern about anomie, Wolfe is keen to emphasize individuals’ capacity for moral discernment and decision, which is not at all inconsistent with Durkheim's (1973 [1898]) own advocacy for a type of moral individualism. Likewise, Jamesian attention to the “varieties of moral experience” is not inconsistent with cohesion in a pluralistic society that values its own pluralism.