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. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CONCEPT OF JIVA IN ADVAITA VEDANTA . . Sarvajnatva of Isvara Vis a vis Avivekatva. According to Sankara, jiva is a complex of both the Identifier and the Identified. The Identifier is Isvaracaitanya and the Identified is the internal organ (antahkarana). Sankara neither calls Isvaracaitanya per se as jiva nor the antahkarana by itself as jiva. Jiva comes into existence only when Isvaracaitanya identifies itself with the antahkarana. This identity is caused by ignorance (avidya). Avidya is in the form of nondiscrimination (aviveka) between the real nature of the Identifier and that of the Identified. Sankara is of the view that jiva gets liberated from such ignorance only when it realizes its original nature as identical with that of Brahman. It is stated that avivekatva is the cause of jivatva. If this be so, whose aviveka is this? Does it belong to Isvaracaitanya or the antahkarana? It cannot belong to the antahkarana because the antahkarana is the Identified. It is itself a product of avidya. It is material by its very nature and therefore, not capable of possessing aviveka. Alternatively, one should accept that aviveka belongs to the Identifier, that is, Isvaracaitanya. One may now ask the question, ‘Is it possible for Isvara, who is omniscient (sarvajna) and self luminous (svayamprakasa), to possess such avidya which is in the form of aviveka?’ It appears that it is not possible. For, even though the Upanisads state that after creating the bodies and the antahkaranas, Isvaracaitanya enters into the cavities of the hearts of living being, we could still ask, ‘When did Isvaracaitanya get entangled with avidya?’ Did Isvaracaitanya possess avidya before entering the cavities of the hearts of living beings? It cannot be so. For if nondiscrimination existed in Isvaracaitanya before It entered into the hearts of living beings then Isvara cannot be called omniscient (sarvajna) and ever liberated (nityamukta) since He would not have been able to discriminate Himself from His own creation. It would not have been possible for Him to enter deliberately and specifically into the cavities of the hearts of living beings. Further, Isvara should have identified Himself with His creation indiscriminately and become attached to the created universe. Thus, Isvara would become a baddha, that is, a limited agent and as a consequence, would have lost His nityamuktatva. Furthermore, if Isvara had aviveka before entering into the living beings, then He cannot be all knowing (sarvajana). For, aviveka refers to lack of discriminatory knowledge, and it would be contradictory to say that sarvajna Isvara does not have, ‘knowledge’ of discrimination. Due to the above mentioned reasons, the advaitin will have to take recourse to the alternative view, namely, that Isvaracaitanya could possess avidya only after entering into living beings. This view too is beset with problems. For, one may ask: ‘How will sarvajna Isvaracaitanya suddenly get possessed of avidya on entering in to living beings?’ Upanisads speak of the association of the intellect and Isvaracaitanya even while jiva goes to the other world. They do not expressly mention that Isvaracaitanya gets entangled with avidya only after entering into the bodies. It implies that such association of avidya with Consciousness existed even before Isvaracaitanya entered into the bodies of the living beings. However, I have already proved above that it is impossible for Isvaracaitanya to possess avidya before entering into the bodies of the living beings. If avidya cannot exist either in the Isvaracaitanya or antahkarana, then where does this aviveka come from? According to Sankara, avidya cannot also exist on its own. Therefore, the very existence of avidya is impossible. Further, without aviveka it is not possible for Isvaracaitanya to identify itself with the antahkarana and without such identity, jivatva of Isvaracaitanya is impossible. Alternatively, setting aside the concept of aviveka, if one wants to believe in the Advaita view that jivacaitnaya is identical with Isvaracaitanya and is distinct from the body, then one has to accept that Isvaracaitanya deliberately identifies Itself with the antahkarana and becomes jiva. If jivatva is due to Isvara’s deliberate assumption then liberation (moksa) for jiva cannot be left to its own choice and efforts. It will have to depend on Isvara. Such a position will not be acceptable to Sankara. All these arguments go to prove that the advaitin’s concepts of jiva and avidya are unsustainable. . . Anaditva of Srsti and Jivatva According to Sankara, Isvara makes use of the merit and demerit of jivas in order to achieve variety in creation. 0 But, it is only after the first creation, depending on the diversification into bodies, etc., that merit and demerit arising out of work (karmaphala) could be possible. For, one can perform karma only in this world and it is possible only after the first diversified creation. However, Sankara takes karmaphala as the cause of the diversified creation. This position leads to the fallacy of mutual dependence, namely, it is only after creation that results of work, depending on the diversification into bodies, etc., could be possible, and the diversification into bodies could be possible only due to the results of work. Sankara, tries to resolve this problem by saying that, the defect, namely, the fallacy of mutual dependence, arises only if transmigration has a beginning. He explains that the transmigratory state has no beginning and therefore, there is nothing contradictory for the fruits of work and the variety in creation to act as cause and effect to each other on the analogy of the seed and the sprout. Sankara gives the reasons for the beginninglessness of the transmigratory existence. One such reason is, had it emerged capriciously all of a sudden, then there would have been the predicament of freed souls also being reborn here, and also the contingency of results accruing from non-existing causes, for the differences in happiness and misery would have no logical explanation. Sankara argues that if creation is conceived as beginningless, then, the fallacy of mutual dependence does not arise even as in the case of the seed and the sprout, and hence there will be no defect. In other words, Sankara cannot offer a logical explanation for causality between karma and srsti without seeking recourse to faith in the beginninglessness of jiva and srsti. Faith, because Sankara cannot rationally prove the anaditva of jiva and srsti. That the state of transmigration has no beginning is only an assumption made by Sankara. Perhaps Sankara was forced into the assumption of the anaditva of transmigratory existence for filling up a gap in his arguments. Unless the concept of anaditva could be rationally proved, other concepts in Advaita Vedanta cannot be explained. Now one may raise the question as to what Sankara means by saying that the transmigratory existence is anadi? Does he mean that jiva and srsti do not have a beginning at all? Or does he mean that the beginning of the first creation is not known because of innumerable past cycles of creation? Sankara appears to believe that jiva and srsti do not have a beginning at all. But, it is contradictory to say that jiva and srsti do not have a beginning. For, according to Sankara, everything other than jiva has origination . But the whole of creation, namely, srsti, originated from Brahman. Logically speaking, whatever is created should have a beginning. Therefore, srsti also must have had a beginning. As for the jiva, Sankara holds the view that it has not been created. For, he thinks that jiva is nothing other than Brahman. For Sankara, jiva’s non-creation must also imply its beginninglessness. Even if one were to accept this view of Sankara on jiva’s anaditva, one cannot, yet, accept his view on srsti. For creation necessarily implies a beginning. If anaditva can be denied of srsti, then one is also compelled to reexamine its tenability in respect of jiva. According, to Sankara, jiva is a complex of the unoriginated Brahman and the originated adjunct, that is, intellect. Jiva, while in transmigratory existence cannot be identical with Brahman. If jiva is identical with Brahman always in all levels of existence, only then jiva can be accepted as beginningless. But once this view is accepted, then one cannot differentiate jiva from Brahman. There will then be jivatva for Brahman which, according to